Two Models of the Civil Litigant by Marcus, David
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 64 
Issue 2 Winter 2015: Twentieth Annual Clifford 
Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy - In 
Honor of Jack Weinstein 
Article 14 
Two Models of the Civil Litigant 
David Marcus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
David Marcus, Two Models of the Civil Litigant, 64 DePaul L. Rev. (2015) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol64/iss2/14 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
TWO MODELS OF THE CIVIL LITIGANT
David Marcus*
INTRODUCTION
Assume a children’s rights organization brings a class action on be-
half of all children in a state’s foster care system.  The organization
seeks a structural injunction to remedy widespread deficiencies in the
system’s administration.  The complaint tells a sickening story of ram-
pant sexual and physical abuse, overextended and indifferent
caseworkers, and children routinely bounced from one home to an-
other.  Although some of these injuries could support individual
claims for money damages,1 the organization decides not to pursue
this sort of relief.  It rightly determines that its chances for class certi-
fication, and ultimately its chances to obtain the system-wide injunc-
tion, increase if it eschews claims for money damages and the
individualized issues they raise.
This choice might create a problem.  Judgments in class actions gen-
erate preclusive effects, according to the same general principles that
govern individual judgments.2  A chance exists that, should the foster
care class action proceed to final judgment, res judicata might bar all
class members from seeking money damages for injuries that arise out
of the same events the organization targets with its suit for injunctive
relief.3  A question thus arises: does the organization adequately re-
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona Rogers College of Law.  I am grateful to the other
participants at the 2014 Clifford Symposium at the DePaul University College of Law for very
helpful reactions and comments.  I particularly thank Stephan Landsman, for inviting me to par-
ticipate in a terrific conference; Robert Clifford, for his unparalleled contributions to the study
of civil justice; and Judge Jack Weinstein, for his remarkable life and career.
1. E.g., Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 998–1001 (9th Cir. 2012).
2. 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 16:14 (4th ed.
2002).
3. The majority view among the lower federal courts is that a judgment obtained in a class
action brought solely for injunctive relief does not preclude individual class members from pur-
suing damages claims on their own in subsequent lawsuits. E.g., Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287,
1291 (9th Cir. 1996); Thorpe v. District of Columbia, No. 10-2250 (ESH), 2014 WL 1273134, at
*26 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2014); Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 991 (D. Ariz.
2011).  In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), however, the United States
Supreme Court suggested that, if a plaintiff class elects to forego damages claims arising from
the same events that generate claims for equitable relief, the decision might preclude the litiga-
tion of the damages claims going forward, id. at 2559. Wal-Mart may prompt reexamination of
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present the interests of the foster children in the class action if it
passes on potentially valuable claims for money damages to facilitate
class certification and ultimately the pursuit of the structural
injunction?
The right answer to this unsettled question might depend on how
best to conceive of the civil litigant.  If each litigant is a discrete indi-
vidual, vested with a right to seek a remedy tailored to her particular
circumstances, then the sacrifice of individual damages to further the
interests of the group may be wrong.  If, however, litigants are better
thought of as members of communities, with their rights and obliga-
tions determined by group ties, then perhaps the organization may
more properly pursue collective redress at the expense of individual
compensation.
Answers to many such procedural problems depend on how the re-
lationships among people impacted by events that generate litigation
are understood to affect their identities as civil litigants.  To provide a
theoretical framework for thinking about the connection between pro-
cedural doctrine and group ties, I develop two conceptions, or models,
of the civil litigant.  I draw inspiration for the first model from the
remarkable procedural jurisprudence of Judge Jack Weinstein, rightly
celebrated in the festschrift to which this Article is a contribution.
Judge Weinstein has shaped procedural doctrine in ways that sacrifice
individual litigant control to serve communal ends.  Also, he believes
that the substantive makeup of litigants’ claims, defenses, and reme-
dies—what I refer to here as a litigant’s “legal identity”—can depend
on communal ties among litigants.  To Judge Weinstein, litigants are
not isolated individuals, but members of a community that defines
them, and to which they owe obligations.  His conception is the “com-
munity member” model (CM model) of the civil litigant.
The fast-growing corpus of procedural decisions issued by the Rob-
erts Court inspires a competing model of the civil litigant.  The Court
has strengthened the control that individual litigants exercise over
their participation in litigation.  Also, it has refused to allow the inter-
ests of larger populations or the regulatory imperatives of the substan-
tive law to affect the makeup of litigants’ legal identities.  These
preferences are those of a decision maker who treats litigants as “au-
the majority view. E.g., Richardson v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198–200 (D.D.C.
2013).  In one unpublished order issued in a foster care reform class action, a district judge
concluded that the prospect of preclusion of money damages claims weighed against a finding of
adequate representation when the class representative sought only injunctive relief.  Clark Cnty.
Defendants’ Proposed Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 7–8,
Clark K. v. Willden, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Nev. 2008) (No. 2:06-cv-01068-RCJ-RJJ).
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tonomous individuals”; I therefore call the Court’s conception the
“autonomous individual” model (AI model).
The AI and CM models offer useful ways to organize and under-
stand themes in procedural decisions that impact litigant freedom and
distinctiveness.  I define the two models in Part II, then show how
commitments to their core tenets have led the Court and Judge Wein-
stein to treat individual litigants differently in each’s procedural juris-
prudence.  In Part III, I question whether the Court’s AI model has
sufficient historical, doctrinal, or normative support to justify its cap-
ture of the Justices’ procedural imaginations.  Several decades ago, the
federal judiciary tolerated doctrinal experiments in civil procedure
that tried to strike a balance between individual litigant autonomy and
distinctiveness, on one hand, and communal or regulatory ends, on the
other.4  During these years of exuberant creativity, no judge influ-
enced the development of American procedural doctrine more than
Judge Weinstein.  If prevailing attitudes about procedural design are
any indicator, this era has lapsed.  Its end may herald a dramatic de-
crease in the capacity of American civil litigation to deliver broad,
evenly distributed rights vindication—a goal Judge Weinstein has pur-
sued relentlessly for fifty years.
The choice between the AI and CM models has high stakes.  Take
the foster care case as an example.  Advocates have successfully ob-
tained systemic relief in class actions brought against child welfare
agencies in more than thirty states.5  If procedural doctrine requires
attention to the individual circumstances and needs of each child,
plaintiffs will have much greater difficulty aggregating claims, seri-
ously impairing the capacity of the judiciary to generate structural re-
form.  The unalloyed individualism in the Roberts Court’s procedural
jurisprudence threatens this and many other types of aggregate litiga-
tion.6  But if I am right that the AI model rests on an incomplete foun-
4. See generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und
Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 626–43 (2013) (describing attempts by federal
courts in the 1970s to strike this balance in class action doctrine).
5. E.g., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: ANALYSIS
OF THIRTY-FIVE COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005, at 2 (2005), available at  http://thehill.com/
sites/default/files/consentdecrees_0.pdf.
6. The Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, discussed infra
Part II.B.2, portends a significant alteration in class certification doctrine for structural reform
litigation.  For Wal-Mart’s influence on foster care reform litigation, see M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg
v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839–41 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Thorpe, 2014 WL 1273134, at *2 (discuss-
ing Wal-Mart’s significance for class certification in a disabilities rights case); Aguilar v. Immigra-
tion & Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 07 Civ. 8224(KBF), 2012
WL 1344417, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2012) (describing Wal-Mart’s influence in a case chal-
lenging enforcement practices by immigration officials).
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dation, no good reason exists to explain why Judge Weinstein’s
procedural vision should not continue to steer the development of
American civil procedure for another five decades.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, JUDGE WEINSTEIN, AND THEIR MODELS
OF THE CIVIL LITIGANT
One could scarcely imagine a sharper contrast between the prevail-
ing ideologies of the Roberts Court, on one hand, and Judge Wein-
stein’s judicial orientation, on the other. This juxtaposition is obvious
when one examines contrasting themes in their procedural decisions—
themes that bear the hallmarks of each model of the civil litigant.  I
begin this Part with a definition of each model.  I then argue that a
decision maker committed to the AI model would resolve procedural
problems implicating litigant identity and autonomy as the Roberts
Court has in recent years, while Judge Weinstein’s procedural juris-
prudence exemplifies the CM model’s normative commitments.
A. The Two Models
The best way to define the AI and CM models is by contrasting
each of their three core tenets.  The first involves a litigant’s legal
identity.  An “autonomous individual” asserts an interest, such as a
claim or defense, with a substantive makeup that does not vary de-
pending on the size or composition of the population affected by the
events that generate litigation.  To quote an advocate for individual-
ism in procedural design, a claim or defense exists in an “abstract,
pristine” form, determined without reference to any community.7  A
securities fraud plaintiff conceived of as an autonomous individual, for
example, adduces the same evidence to establish reliance whether she
sues individually or as part of a class.  In contrast, communal context
can determine the legal identity of a “community member.”  To use
the same example, the CM model accepts that the composition of the
reliance element might change depending upon whether the securities
fraud plaintiff proceeds alone or joined in a class action.
The second primary difference between the two models involves lit-
igant autonomy.  As its name implies, the AI model takes a libertarian
approach to litigant decision making.  The choices of others affected
by the events generating litigation cannot constrain how an autono-
mous individual participates in litigation.  A decision maker commit-
ted to the AI model would treat the class action device with
7. Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Founda-
tions of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1592 (2007).
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skepticism.  The CM model privileges community needs and permits
restrictions on a litigant’s individual freedom in the service of those
needs.  A judge who views civil litigants as “community members”
grants class certification more readily.
Remedial emphases provide the third primary difference.  The AI
model treats litigation as a discrete episode that commences when a
particular individual files suit.  It ends when a decision maker adjudi-
cates the entitlements of individual participants to remedies tailored
to their particular injuries or needs, or when the individual partici-
pants settle on terms that satisfy their private interests.  Litigation suc-
ceeds when one individual receives a reasonable approximation of
whatever the substantive law offers her.  The CM model, in contrast,
prioritizes individual redress less and communal objectives more.  Lit-
igation produces good results when it generates remedies that address
the range of community concerns implicated by the events that led to
the lawsuit.  An individual litigant acts not only on her own behalf, but
also on behalf of a community of people with something at stake.
The support I offer in Part III for the CM model (and, by extension,
for Judge Weinstein’s procedural jurisprudence) includes the argu-
ment that, as a general matter, decision makers are not compelled by
law to accept one model or the other.  Governing law makes the
choice in specific instances.  An employment discrimination plaintiff
in some circuits, for example, cannot bring a pattern-or-practice claim
unless she does so as a member of a class.8  A pattern-or-practice
plaintiff cannot be an “autonomous individual” in these circuits, as her
claim’s existence depends on her communal ties.  When, however, au-
thoritative doctrine does not require a decision maker to treat litigants
as either autonomous individuals or community members, the deci-
sion maker’s normative preferences for procedural design will lead
her to favor one model or the other.  I illustrate how preferences in-
fluence design with the contrasting procedural paths that Judge Wein-
stein and the Roberts Court have followed.
B. The AI Model in the United States Supreme Court
The Roberts Court has paid unprecedented attention to problems
of civil procedure,9 assembling a portfolio of procedural work that has
8. E.g., Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 967–69 (11th Cir. 2008);
Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2001).
9. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1543, 1603–06 (2014) (documenting the “spike” in Supreme Court opinions on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over the past decade); see also Howard M. Wasserman, The
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begun to exhibit distinct trends.10  Several themes in its decisions sug-
gest that a majority of Justices conceive of litigants as autonomous
individuals.  Consistent with the AI model’s core tenets, the Court has
favored individual control over days-in-court, it has refused to allow
case size to affect the substantive law’s makeup, and it treats individ-
ual remedies as civil litigation’s primary objective.
1. Days-in-Court and Individual Autonomy
The Court treats an individual’s power to control her own day-in-
court as an intrinsic value that procedural doctrine should honor.11
Taylor v. Sturgell12 offers a straightforward message about this value’s
importance.  The decision, issued in 2008, strictly limits those instances
when the actions of other parties can strip a litigant of control over the
terms under which a court can adjudicate her interests.13  Before the
Court acted, some circuits had embraced a flexible standard for res
judicata that, under certain circumstances, empowered a judgment to
bind nonparties, provided that a party had represented the nonparties’
interests adequately.14  The lower courts in Taylor had relied on this
doctrine of “virtual representation.”15  An antique aircraft enthusiast
seeking technical specifications for a 1930s-era airplane brought and
lost a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) claim against the Federal
Aviation Administration.16  The enthusiast’s friend, represented by
the enthusiast’s lawyer, then filed an identical FOIA lawsuit, seeking
the same technical specifications.17  The lower courts dismissed the
friend’s claim as precluded by the judgment in the enthusiast’s case,
concluding that the enthusiast had adequately represented his friend’s
interests.18
Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 314–15 (2012) (describing
“[t]he Court’s re-engagement with civil procedure” under Chief Justice Roberts).
10. E.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 366–67
(2013) (commenting on claims that the Roberts Court’s procedural decisions manifest a pro-
business tilt); Wasserman, supra note 9, at 328.
11. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311–12 (2013); see also J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opinion); Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93, 898 (2008).
12. 553 U.S. 880.
13. Id. at 900.
14. E.g., Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 760–62 (1st Cir. 1994).
15. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 884.
16. Id. at 885–86.
17. Id. at 887–89.
18. Id. at 888–91. The lower courts required more than just a showing of adequate representa-
tion to find nonparty preclusion, but adequacy was an essential finding. Id. at 890.
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The Supreme Court reversed, and in so doing, largely eliminated
virtual representation doctrine.19  The sort of nonparty preclusion the
doctrine had permitted, the Court held, conflicted with the “deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court.”20  The Court used more than tradition to support this holding,
identifying a couple of pragmatic objections to virtual representa-
tion.21  But the primary reason it gave for the doctrine’s demise treats
individual control over litigation decisions as something of a
grundnorm.22
The FOIA claims in the two suits did not vary in the slightest, so
Taylor offers a particularly strong endorsement for individual control
over days-in-court.23  As such, the decision is the sort that a procedu-
ral designer who finds intrinsic value in litigant autonomy—that is,
value unrelated to outcome quality—would prefer.24 Taylor also ex-
presses an atomistic understanding of legal identity.25  The virtual rep-
resentation doctrine, which had flourished in some circuits before the
decision, hinged the makeup of litigants’ claims in part on whether
others with similar interests had already sought to vindicate them.26
By repudiating the doctrine, Taylor ensured that nothing the enthusi-
ast did with his claim would affect the contours of the friend’s claim.27
A less obvious but related message about the intrinsic value of liti-
gant autonomy lurks in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Res-
taurant,28 decided in June 2013.  A restaurant had done business with
a credit card company pursuant to a form contract that included an
19. Id. at 893–95, 904, 907 (describing six categories of permissible nonparty preclusion).
20. Id. at 892–93 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
21. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 900–01.
22. As the Court reasoned, “[O]ur decisions emphasize the fundamental nature of the general
rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party.” Id. at 898 (emphasis
added).
23. Id. at 885–88.
24. Professor Martin Redish, the most accomplished and sophisticated advocate of individual-
ism in civil procedure, has celebrated Taylor v. Sturgell as consistent with a “process-based the-
ory” of due process that “values participation either for its legitimizing effect in the eyes of the
litigants or its facilitation of the citizen’s role in democratic governance, whether or not decision
making accuracy is improved as a result.”  Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v.
Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representa-
tion Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1889–90 (2009). He continues: “[T]here may be a
value in permitting each litigant to personally participate—have her day in court—that is en-
tirely distinct from the value in securing an accurate outcome.” Id. at 1890.  Professor Redish
faults the Court for not asserting this theory explicitly but otherwise praises the decision. Id. at
1887.
25. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 904.
26. Id. at 895, 901.
27. Id. at 885.
28. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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arbitration clause and a class action waiver.29  Notwithstanding these
provisions, the restaurant brought a class action in federal court
against the company, alleging antitrust violations.30  The class action
waiver should not be enforced, the restaurant argued, because the cost
of litigating its claims individually in arbitration would exceed the
value of the claims themselves.31  Simple economics would thereby en-
sure that the restaurant would eschew the vindication of its rights alto-
gether and leave the substantive law unenforced unless it could spread
litigation costs across a class of similar claims.32  But the Court’s ma-
jority was unmoved.33  Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) doctrine argua-
bly recognizes a defense to enforcement when enforcement would
prevent the “effective vindication of a federal statutory right.”34  But
the exception did not apply.  The Court reasoned that “the fact that it
is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy,”35
even if only an irrational person would lose money to engage in this
pursuit.
Amex has little appeal if the success of a procedural doctrine that
regulates access to adjudication depends on its capacity to generate
substantive law enforcement.  Someone committed to the CM model
would fault Amex for this reason, because substantive law enforce-
ment serves the interests of a community of regulatory beneficiaries.
If, however, the metric for success asks whether the decision leaves an
individual litigant free to choose to participate when she wants—the
intrinsic value heralded in Taylor,36 and one of the AI model’s core
tenets—then Amex fares better.
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,37 a personal jurisdiction
case decided in 2011, is yet another recent decision that privileges in-
dividual control over the terms of participation in litigation.38  The de-
fendant, a British heavy equipment manufacturer, sold a machine for
use in scrap metal recycling to its American distributor.39  The distrib-
utor then resold the machine to a New Jersey factory, where the ma-
29. Id. at 2308.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2310.
34. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id. at 2311.
36. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93, 904 (2008).
37. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 2791.
39. Id. at 2786.
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chine injured a metalworker.40  He sued the British manufacturer in
New Jersey state court.41
The manufacturer had targeted the entire United States as an undif-
ferentiated market for its products, and it did nothing to keep its ma-
chines out of New Jersey, the state with more scrap metal recycling
than any other.42  Nonetheless, the plurality agreed that the manufac-
turer had not purposefully availed itself of the state, and thus that the
New Jersey court lacked personal jurisdiction.43  The size of New
Jersey’s scrap metal recycling industry arguably gave the state a signif-
icant interest in the regulation of industry participants through civil
litigation in its courts.44  But the legitimate reach of New Jersey’s reg-
ulatory authority played no role in the plurality’s jurisdictional
calculus.45  Rather, taking a libertarian turn,46 the plurality hinged the
court’s jurisdiction on the choices the defendant had made as it struc-
tured its business to interact with sovereigns of its choosing.47  Be-
cause the manufacturer had not itself specifically targeted New Jersey
for sales, a New Jersey court lacked jurisdiction.48  As Justice Gins-
burg noted in her dissent,49 the plurality opinion effectively makes the
willingness of a litigant to submit to a particular sovereign’s authority
the linchpin for jurisdictional analysis.50
2. The Irrelevance of Community Impact to Legal Identity
The AI model denies that a litigant’s legal identity can change de-
pending on the size and composition of the population affected by the
litigation-generating event.  A link obviously connects the event to the
procedures litigants invoke.  A rise in the number of affected individu-
als may trigger various joinder devices, such as the class action rule.51
But this link does not extend beyond procedure; the extent of an
event’s communal impact does not influence the makeup of litigants’
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
43. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790–91 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion) (“A sovereign’s legislative authority to regulate conduct
may present considerations different from those presented by its authority to subject a defendant
to judgment in its courts.”).
46. See Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 1–2.
47. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789–90.
48. Id. at 2790–91.
49. Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (framing and critiquing the plurality’s argument).
50. See id. at 2787–88 (plurality opinion).
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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claims and defenses.  Two of the Court’s recent decisions indicate
agreement with this core tenet.52
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate Insurance Co.,53 decided in 2010,  conceives of the substantive
law as cordoned off from the influence of aggregate procedure.  The
plaintiffs sued Allstate Insurance Company under a New York law
that imposed penalties on insurers for tardy reimbursements.54  The
law also prohibited the aggregation of these penalty claims in class
actions.55  The plaintiffs thus filed a class action in federal court and
argued that Rule 2356 preempted the New York joinder restriction.57
Allstate invoked the Rules Enabling Act (Enabling Act) in re-
sponse.58  If New York law applied and class certification were denied,
Allstate faced a potential liability of $500 under the applicable sub-
stantive law, or the value of the individual named plaintiff’s claim.59
No other victim would sue, deterred by the imbalance between litiga-
tion costs and the modesty of the statutory penalty.60  Class certifica-
tion under Rule 23 would transform this potential liability into $5
million, or the aggregate value of 1,000 identical claims no longer left
fallow.61  The application of Rule 23 alone would dramatically alter
the substantive law’s effective meaning for Allstate, in violation of the
Enabling Act’s requirement that rules of procedure not “abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right.”62
The Court disagreed with Allstate, holding that Rule 23 preempts
the New York law.63  Allstate’s “aggregate liability,” Justice Scalia
reasoned for a plurality of Justices, “does not depend on whether the
suit proceeds as a class action.”64  Rather,
[e]ach of the 1,000-plus members of the putative class could . . .
bring a freestanding suit asserting his individual claim.  It is un-
doubtedly true that some plaintiffs would not bring individual suits
for the relatively small sums involved will choose to join a class ac-
52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011); Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408–09 (2010) (plurality opinion).
53. 559 U.S. 393.
54. Id. at 397.
55. Id. at 396–97.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
57. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397.
58. Id. at 408–09.
59. Id. at 408.
60. Id. at 408.
61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012); Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408–09.
63. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398–99.
64. Id. at 408.
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tion. That has no bearing, however, on Allstate’s or the plaintiffs’
legal rights.65
Rule 23, just “a species” of “traditional joinder,” “merely enables a
federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once.”66  It
“leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of deci-
sion unchanged.”67
Justice Scalia’s insistence that the aggregation of claimants does not
alter Allstate’s actual substantive liability smacks of formalism.68  But
Shady Grove implies that form, not felt experience, matters to a
proper understanding of the relationship between Allstate’s legal
identity and the community of insureds impacted by its belated reim-
bursement practices.69  Rule 23 simply adds together independent,
fully formed claims that preexist in some “abstract, pristine” form
before aggregation.70  Their joinder does not somehow transform the
substance of Allstate’s legal identity in terms of the exposure it faced
under the New York insurance law.71
Like Shady Grove, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,72 decided in
2011, rejects a connection between the size of the community involved
in the litigation and the makeup of any particular individual’s claim or
defense.73  The plaintiffs sued Wal-Mart for gender discrimination on
behalf of a class of 1.5 million current and former female employees,
seeking back pay and other remedies.74  Under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, an employer can defend against a particular em-
ployee’s claim for back pay if “such individual” suffered an adverse
employment action “for any reason other than discrimination.”75
Wal-Mart argued that this statutory language entitled it to contest
each employee’s claim for back pay, rendering the litigation incapable
of classwide resolution and the case therefore uncertifiable as a class
action.76  In response, the Ninth Circuit proposed that the parties se-
lect a statistically significant number of employees, litigate their back
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 64–66 (2010).
69. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408–09.
70. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 7, at 1592.
71. For more discussion of this theme, see Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation–Arbitration
Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1085–87 (2011).
72. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
73. Id. at 2561.
74. Id. at 2547.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) (2012).
76. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2549.
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pay claims individually, and then extrapolate the results for the class
as a whole.77  This trial plan would have made most back pay claims
resolvable in the aggregate and thus facilitate class certification.  Had
the Court agreed and upheld class certification, the size of the popula-
tion of plaintiffs Wal-Mart faced would have had determinative influ-
ence for the substantive makeup of its defense.  The right to defend
against each employee’s claim for back pay would have yielded to a
right to defend against a selected sample of employee claims, and then
to contest the extrapolated significance of this sample for the class as a
whole.
The Court rejected this “Trial by Formula,” as Justice Scalia deri-
sively labeled it, because the plaintiffs devised it to facilitate class cer-
tification under Rule 23.78  If class certification changed the parties’
evidentiary burdens and opportunities to litigate, then the application
of Rule 23 altered substantive rights in violation of the Enabling
Act.79  To put the thrust of this holding in AI model terms, the Court
refused to allow the makeup of Wal-Mart’s substantive legal identity,
defined by the defenses it could assert, to change simply to account for
the size of the community of alleged victims.
3. Individualistic Remedial Emphasis
AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion,80 decided in 2011, stands for
the idea that individual redress is civil litigation’s primary remedial
goal, and that any broader regulatory effect that private litigation
might have is merely incidental.81  Like Amex, Concepcion involved a
challenge to the enforcement of a class action waiver coupled with an
arbitration clause included in a consumer form contract.82  The Con-
cepcion contract differed from the Amex one, however, because the
former included certain “sweeteners,” such as attorneys’ fees provi-
sions and damages enhancements, ostensibly designed to incentivize
customers with only modest injuries to file claims.83  The lower courts
invalidated the clause/waiver combination as unlawfully exculpatory
77. Id. at 2561.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
81. Id. at 1753.  On this theme in general, see generally George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T
Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24 (2012),
available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/Rutherglen.pdf.
82. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
83. Id.; see also Nagareda, supra note 71, at 1118–19.
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and therefore unconscionable.84  The sweeteners might ensure that ar-
bitration expenses would not dissuade a customer aware of her injury
and motivated to do something about it from pursuing a claim and
obtaining compensation.85  But few customers would recognize or
care about their injuries.86  Even if the sweeteners guaranteed com-
pensation to any individual determined enough to file a claim, the dis-
trict court observed, they could not generate enough filings
successfully to address an “overarching policy concern of deterring
corporate wrongdoing.”87  The district court therefore voided the
clause as exculpatory, not because it denied compensation to moti-
vated individual claimants, but because it enabled the defendant to
dodge the regulatory force of the substantive law.88
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any exculpation-based
defense that the FAA recognizes misfired in this instance.89  The
sweeteners enabled the “individual prosecution of meritorious claims”
for those who chose to avail themselves of arbitration.90  Concerns
about the many claims that would go unfiled, and by implication the
deterrence lost, were “unrelated” to the FAA’s exceptions and poli-
cies.91  To the Court, exculpation meant a disruption to individuals’
abilities to press their claims, not foregone law enforcement for a
community of regulatory beneficiaries.92  This understanding fits the
AI model perfectly.  Autonomous individuals are not undifferentiated
vehicles for law enforcement, but distinct persons free to seek or
abandon a remedy tailored for them.93  If a doctrine allows them this
choice, it cannot be exculpatory.
84. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *8 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008).
85. Nagareda, supra note 71, at 1119.
86. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *8; see also Nagareda, supra note 71, at 1119.
87. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14.
88. Id. at *14 (“Faithful adherence to California’s stated policy of favoring class litigation and
arbitration to deter alleged fraudulent conduct in cases involving large numbers of consumers
with small amounts of damages, compels the Court to invalidate ATTM’s class waiver provi-
sion.”).  The district court followed the California Supreme Court, which had previously held
thusly.  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
89. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746–48, 1753.  Justice Thomas argued that no such defense
exists. Id. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1746–48.
93. Cf. Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action:
A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 645 n.144 [hereinafter Redish et al.,
Cy Pres Relief] (“[W]hatever impact federal adjudication may have on the public interest must
come as an incident to the assertion and adjudication of narrower, personal interests.” (quoting
Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of
Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 86)).
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C. The “Community Member” Model in Judge Weinstein’s
Procedural Jurisprudence
The Court’s recent decisions stress individual autonomy and distinc-
tiveness.  Judge Weinstein’s procedural jurisprudence contrasts
sharply.  He has warned against an “individualism run riot” in the pro-
cedural regulation of civil litigation.94  “[D]ignity [may be] enhanced
by individual control of litigation for each person’s own benefit,”95
Judge Weinstein acknowledges, but civil litigation must also respond
to the concerns of communities impacted by litigation-generating
events.96  When Judge Weinstein has addressed procedural problems
involving the scope of litigant autonomy, the substantive makeup of
litigant identity, or civil litigation’s remedial emphasis, his communi-
tarian-inflected responses are those a decision maker committed to
the CM model would adopt.97
1. Pragmatic Benefits of Broad Participation
Judge Weinstein has expressed little patience for the sort of individ-
ual day-in-court fundamentalism championed by the Taylor court.98
The “traditional assumption that each individual plaintiff is entitled to
control his own case,” he believes, “had more force in the era of the
horse and buggy.”99  It is not that Judge Weinstein does little to enable
individuals ensnared in litigation-generating events to appear in court.
Indeed, he has argued, the voice that adjudication gives to individuals
distinguishes the process from more depersonalized, bureaucratic
ones in American government.100  But individual litigant participation
lacks intrinsic value as an end unto itself.  Rather, Judge Weinstein
aims for the involvement of a broad array of people in litigation, be-
94. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 47 (1995).
95. Id. at 46.
96. See, e.g., id. at 47 (“Compensation to the individual is not the end-all of modern mass tort
law; the effects of remedies on the community cannot be ignored.”); Helen E. Freedman &
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Managing Mass Torts, 80 JUDICATURE 44, 44 (1996) (reviewing WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 94); Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Mis-
placed, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 583 (1994).
97. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 94, at 48 (identifying as a communitarian).
98. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93, 898 (2008).
99. Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigations, 2009
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 14, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/denovo/
WEINSTEIN_2009_1.pdf; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass So-
ciety, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 385, 403 (2000).
100. Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administra-
tive, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 975–76.
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yond the parties named in the suit,101 because of the good results this
participation produces.  For one thing, broad participation produces
good substantive outcomes.  The “right to be heard before [a person’s]
fate is sealed. . . . is vital to the effective functioning of the court,”
because “it minimizes the chance of error due to the lack either of
knowledge or appreciation of the variety of interests that may be
affected.”102
For another, participation produces a public dialogue among those
affected by the litigation-generating event that can strengthen adjudi-
cation’s legitimacy.  This dialogue “increases the sense of dignity of
the participating person as an important entity, one who counts and
will be heard.”103  Solicitude for individuals’ perspectives is not just a
palliative for victims but important for “[p]ublic confidence in our sys-
tem of justice.”104
This pragmatism steers Judge Weinstein away from the protection
of individual control over days-in-court as fundamentally important
and toward at least four approaches to procedural design consistent
with the core tenets of the CM model.  First, these public benefits of
better law enforcement and strengthened legitimacy give courts a rea-
son to do more than simply ensure that parties are not formally barred
from asserting their own interests.  To increase participation, courts
should take affirmative steps to overcome a person’s inertia, disinter-
est, disincentive, intimidation, or disability.105  To this end, Judge
Weinstein has solicited input on key litigation decisions from absent
class members through surveys,106 and he has immersed himself in the
experiences of people impacted by litigation by visiting them in their
communities.107  He has even drafted community members to help
with decision making, to ensure that “the values and standards of the
community” inform a decision “of large moment” for its residents.108
101. Jack B. Weinstein, Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions—Some
Views on Participation, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 231, 236–37 (1980).
102. Id. at 232.
103. WEINSTEIN, supra note 94, at 47.
104. Bilello v. Abbott Labs., 825 F. Supp. 475, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also David Luban,
Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2075 (1997).
105. E.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 94, at 2–3 (describing ways in which Judge Weinstein has
strived to “provide individual justice . . . in a mass context”).
106. D.S. ex rel. S.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also
Knight v. Bd. of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
107. E.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 173–78 (1986); WEINSTEIN, supra note 94, at 94–95; Martha Minow, Judge for the Situa-
tion: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2010, 2012–15 (1997).
108. NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 391, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the
court could empanel an advisory jury to help with decision making in a case for injunctive relief).
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Second, a court does not need to defer to the choices of formally
autonomous litigants for certain litigation decisions.  The Zyprexa
mass tort litigation involved the joinder of thousands of individual
cases, each one filed by a plaintiff who had entered into a retainer
agreement with an attorney.109  These contracts included fee provi-
sions.110  Each individual plaintiff therefore consented to the surren-
der of a portion of her recovery to her lawyer.111  Judge Weinstein
nonetheless insisted that he could order a different fee for the plain-
tiffs’ lawyers than what the total of these individual contracts would
have generated.112  Labeling the litigation a “quasi-class action,”
Judge Weinstein invoked a legitimacy concern—“public perceptions
of the fairness of the judicial process in handling mass torts”—to
trump individual plaintiffs’ formal consent to a different fee
arrangement.113
Third, because individual participation has utilitarian, not deonto-
logical, value, a presumption that everyone should control his or her
own day in court should yield when it does little good.114  In other
words, participation’s consequentialist value is consistent with proce-
dures that de-emphasize the ability of individuals to control the condi-
tions of their involvement in litigation, when such control would
thwart extra-individual objectives.
An example comes from In re DES Cases,115 a decision on personal
jurisdiction wholly inconsistent with McIntyre and its emphasis on liti-
gant autonomy.116  The plaintiffs alleged injuries linked to a drug once
thought to reduce complications during pregnancy.117  A California
manufacturer had contributed to a national marketplace for the drug
but had not targeted New York specifically for any of its sales.118
Sued in Judge Weinstein’s court, the manufacturer moved to dismiss
on grounds that it lacked the requisite ties to create personal jurisdic-
109. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
110. Id. at 493.
111. Id.
112. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122–23 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
113. Id.
114. Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L.
REV. 433, 434 (1960) (insisting that “necessity makes due process” in an article calling for an
expanded preclusive effect of class action judgments).  Judge Weinstein’s lack of concern for
days-in-court as important in and of themselves is evident in his willingness to affirm a “nail-and-
mail” service of process procedure that all but ensured that absentee landlords would not receive
notice of allegations against them.  Sterling v. Envtl. Control Bd., 793 F.2d 52, 53–54 (2d Cir.
1986) (reversing Judge Weinstein’s decision).
115. Ashley v. Abbott Labs. (In re DES Cases), 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
116. Id. at 558.
117. Id. at 558–59.
118. Id. at 559, 592.
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tion in New York.119  Judge Weinstein denied the motion.120  He ob-
served that the New York Court of Appeals had adopted market
share liability, a substantive innovation designed to allocate responsi-
bility for a mass harm according to tortfeasors’ extent of market par-
ticipation, and to impose several, not joint and several, liability on
these tortfeasors.121  A dismissal of one of these tortfeasors on per-
sonal jurisdiction grounds would undermine this turn in the substan-
tive law, by frustrating the ability of plaintiffs to recover in a manner
consistent with the policies behind market share liability.122  The man-
ufacturer had benefited from “the laws of every state,” including New
York, “by participating in the national market for a generic good.”123
Therefore, consistent with the policies behind market share liability,
New York courts could exercise jurisdiction over it.124  To Judge Wein-
stein, the regulatory objectives of the applicable substantive law
served as a primary jurisdictional consideration.125  The manufacturer
could not decide for itself where it would prefer to be sued by struc-
turing its business in a particular way.126
Fourth, different types of participation, beyond that produced by
individual control over days-in-court, can improve outcome quality
and the legitimacy of adjudication.  In the Agent Orange litigation,
Judge Weinstein held hearings around the country to solicit input
from as many veterans as possible on a proposed settlement.127  At
the same time, he all but guaranteed that he would dismiss at sum-
mary judgment the claim of any veteran who opted out of the class
and proceeded individually.128  Judge Weinstein valued veterans’
voices, just not as individual plaintiffs in the formal setting of individ-
ual litigation.
119. Id. at 559.
120. Id. at 594.
121. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 572.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 576.
124. Id. at 592–93, 594.
125. Id. at 576 (“In this instance, . . . where substantive law has undergone significant develop-
ment to accommodate socioeconomic change, it is necessary to interpret jurisdictional law so
that it meets the demands of the subject matter of the litigation.”).
126. Id. at 572.
127. SCHUCK, supra note 107, at 173–78.
128. Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to
Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 156.
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2. Substantive Law and the Determinative Significance of
Communal Impact
In his 1973 remarks on the then-novel class action, Judge Weinstein
insisted that “it is . . . quite unwise to slip into important changes[ ] in
substantive law on the happenstance that a suit is brought by a class
rather than by an individual claimant.”129  His thinking seems to have
evolved.  The Court in Shady Grove and Wal-Mart denied that the size
and composition of the population affected by the litigation-generat-
ing event could have determinative influence on the substantive
makeup of a litigant’s claims or defenses.130  Several of Judge Wein-
stein’s opinions suggest otherwise, consistent with a link the CM
model acknowledges between population size and litigant identity.
Population size has particularly influenced Judge Weinstein’s choice
of law decisions.  He famously identified a single “national substantive
rule” to govern the product liability claims brought by thousands of
veterans hailing from dozens of jurisdictions in the Agent Orange liti-
gation.131  A decision maker confronted with a large number of al-
leged victims, Judge Weinstein reasoned, “might well recognize the
unfairness in treating differently legally identical claims involving ser-
vicemen who fought a difficult foreign war shoulder-to-shoulder.”132
The same choice of law result “would not follow when individual,
rather than class action, suits are tried,” and therefore the makeup of
claims prosecuted by individual veterans on their own differed.133
Judge Weinstein took a similar tack when he invoked “American
fraud theory” in a multistate class action brought against tobacco
companies, to de-emphasize differences among the particular state
laws that would have applied had class members brought their claims
individually.134
The extent of an event’s impact on a community has also deter-
mined litigants’ evidentiary obligations in Judge Weinstein’s court.135
The light cigarette litigation involved claims that tobacco companies
129. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 301–02 (1973).
130. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408–09 (2010)
(plurality opinion); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
131. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also In
re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (describing the
composition of the class); id. at 711–13 (describing the “national consensus” law).
132. In re Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 703.
133. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
134. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2005).
135. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1021–22 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d
sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).
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defrauded customers by misleadingly advertising light cigarettes as
relatively safe for smokers.136  The defendants argued that their right
to litigate each individual class member’s reliance on misrepresenta-
tions of cigarette safety precluded any aggregate processing of claims
and thus class certification.137  Judge Weinstein disagreed, determining
that the plaintiffs could use “[g]eneralized proof,” including “surveys,
expert evidence on marketplace principles, and extrapolated and sta-
tistic analysis of individuals and groups in the class,” to prove reliance
for all class members.138  Thus, while a smoker proceeding alone
would presumably prove reliance with individualized evidence, the
smoker as a class member could avail herself of different generalized
evidence to establish this element of her claim.139
3. Remedial Emphasis
Judge Weinstein has repeatedly emphasized the close relationship
between civil litigation and public administration, often presenting
them as substitute strategies for the implementation of public pol-
icy.140  Consistent with this understanding, he stresses regulatory goals
as at least as important to civil litigation as individual remediation.141
Litigants before Judge Weinstein appear not only as individuals seek-
ing particularized relief, but as stand-ins for others from the same
community of beneficiaries served by the applicable substantive
law.142
This remedial emphasis guided Judge Weinstein’s response to an-
other problem with class certification that arose in the light cigarette
litigation.143  The tobacco companies insisted that class member dam-
ages could not be calculated or distributed through any aggregate pro-
cess.144  Each individual plaintiff had to establish her entitlement to
damages separately, a situation that precluded class certification.145
136. Id. at 1018.
137. Id. at 1046.
138. Id. at 1117.
139. Id. at 1022.
140. See generally Ramirez v. Dollar Phone Corp., No. 09-CV-2290 (JBW) (MDG), 2009 WL
3171738, at *16–18 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2009); Weinstein, supra note 100, at 975–76.
141. E.g., D.S. ex rel. S.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (prais-
ing a settlement in a class action because it will “help[ ] promote voluntary institutional change”
and “inevitably affect parties other than those individuals who are expected to benefit directly”).
142. Haynes v. Planet Automall, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 65, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing the class
action not primarily as a device used to obtain compensation for specific individuals, but as a
“mechanism . . . premised on a public policy favoring the protection of the kind of consumers
found in the proposed class” (emphasis added)).
143. Schwab, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 1239–40.
144. Id. at 1239.
145. Id.
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Judge Weinstein recognized that few individuals would pursue their
claims absent the class action.146  “The consequence of requiring indi-
vidual proof from each smoker,” he observed, “would be to allow a
defendant which has injured millions of people and caused billions of
dollars in damages to escape almost all liability.”147  Judge Weinstein
proposed a “fluid recovery” plan as an alternative to the class action-
thwarting insistence on particularized evidence.148  Damages would be
calculated in the aggregate, then distributed pro rata to each class
member regardless of whom the tobacco companies had actually de-
frauded.149  Judge Weinstein acknowledged that this plan would “run
the risk of overcompensating some and undercompensating other
members of the class,”150 a separation of litigant from remedy at odds
with core tenets of the AI model.  But he justified this innovation, at
least in part, because it would help obtain regulatory benefits.151
“Fluid recovery,” Judge Weinstein wrote, offered “a means of fulfil-
ling the promise of class actions as a consumer protection device.”152
* * *
I have presented the AI and CM models as alternative conceptions
of the civil litigant thus far.  But they are not equally plausible alterna-
tives, at least insofar as they purport to describe prevailing approaches
to procedural design.  While academia remains chock full of Judge
Weinstein’s admirers,153 the Supreme Court, following the lead of
146. Id. at 1240.
147. Id.
148. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. CV 04-1945(JBW), 2005 WL 3032556, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *18.
151. Id. at *8.
152. Id.
153. In her contribution to this festschrift, Linda Mullenix elegantly surveys decades of aca-
demic debate on autonomy versus aggregation in procedural scholarship and indicates that,
among scholars, an emphasis on litigant autonomy remains a minority view.  Linda S. Mullenix,
Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in an Age of Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L.
REV. 601, 621–27 (summarizing contemporary academic debates).  She also quite rightly notes
that, as judicial resistance to class action procedure has grown, aggregate litigation has taken on
different forms, and that claim aggregation remains vibrant. Id. at 623.  To my mind, however,
the shift to nonclass mechanisms for aggregation is telling.  These mechanisms primarily involve
the joinder of individually filed actions, and nonclass aggregate settlements require individual
plaintiffs affirmatively to opt in.  These settlements derive their legitimacy from individual liti-
gant consent—in other words, an autonomous choice to be bound.  Howard M. Erichson &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 269 (2011). While this
consent may be inauthentic, id. at 301, it nonetheless represents a significant and revealing de-
parture from the sort of legitimizing mechanisms that support class action judgments.
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lower courts,154 has steered American civil procedure in a decidedly
individualistic direction over the last couple of decades.155  As Judge
Weinstein has observed,
The courts, including some of the best judges on the intermediate
appellate and Supreme Court, have been strongly influenced by
what is our traditional assumption: that each individual plaintiff is
entitled to control his own case and that each defendant is entitled
to defend against individual plaintiffs. . . . [That rationale] is not
convincing today, where decisions affecting the lives of millions or
billions of people are made by faceless corporations and others in
this and other countries.  An individual one-to-one responsibility is
impossible to ascertain and compensate for.156
As Wal-Mart, Amex, and Concepcion suggest, this individualism has
helped to limit certain procedural mechanisms, such as the class ac-
tion, that otherwise particularly promise wide and equitable protec-
tion against mass harms.157  Increasingly, Judge Weinstein, an
iconoclastic, “1960s-style activist judge,”158 wanders alone in a proce-
dural wilderness.
III. THE QUESTIONABLE CASE FOR THE AUTONOMOUS
INDIVIDUAL MODEL
The AI model may count among its adherents a majority of Justices
on the Supreme Court, and it is consistent with a recent surge of indi-
vidualism in procedural design.  But this ascendancy rests on an unfin-
ished foundation.  What follows is hardly a complete argument for the
CM model and its communitarian ramifications for procedural doc-
trine.  I recognize that the CM model comes with a price, and any
complete defense must grapple with its limitations.  My ambition in
this Part is modest.  Enthusiasts for individualism and critics of Judge
Weinstein’s procedural outlook have advanced a number of doctrinal
and theoretical arguments that are the sort an advocate for the AI
model might offer.  In this Part, I challenge these arguments,
grounded in history, doctrine, and normative theory, as insufficient to
154. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729,
745–822 (2013) (describing many ways by which the federal courts have restricted the use of the
class action device over the past decade or so, with most changes spearheaded by lower courts).
155. Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
545, 559 (2012) (commenting on the “individualistic focus” in “recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence”).
156. Weinstein, supra note 99, at 14.
157. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011); Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311–12 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1746–48, 1753 (2011).
158. Mullenix, supra note 96, at 580; see also Minow, supra note 107, at 2032 (describing Judge
Weinstein as “iconoclastic”).
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justify a rejection of the communitarian approach to civil procedure
that the CM model takes.
A. The AI Model and the History of Procedure’s Present
The AI model conveys a libertarian preference for doctrinal design.
Procedural rules should ensure that individual litigants control their
own days-in-court, and that civil litigation produces uniquely tailored
remedies for them.  Procedural doctrine should remain agnostic to
whether individuals actually pursue their claims or obtain remedies, so
long as formal legal barriers do not block individuals who want to do
so.  Because public policy is mostly indifferent to whether an individ-
ual decides to litigate or not, the state has little business crafting subsi-
dies, such as the class action device,159 to trump individual initiative
and prompt litigation.
The normative primacy of individual litigant choice fits what Abram
Chayes famously described as “our received tradition” in civil litiga-
tion.160  A lawsuit, traditionally understood, is “a contest between two
individuals or at least two unitary interests.”161  It is “party-initiated
and party-controlled,” and the judge is a “neutral arbiter of [the par-
ties’] interactions.”162  Several of the Court’s opinions discussed in
Part II invoke this tradition as support for individualism in procedural
design.163  If this “received tradition” describes present-day civil litiga-
tion, the AI model would make sense as the most historically appro-
priate description of the civil litigant.
But the American system of civil justice left our “received tradi-
tion” behind long ago, at least since the 1960s.  A libertarian approach
to civil procedure that values litigant autonomy above all does not fit
the regulatory role lawmakers have assigned civil litigation since this
time.  The last fifty years, an era that Judge Weinstein’s judicial career
spans, have witnessed the dramatic proliferation of litigation-enhanc-
ing devices in legislation and positively enacted procedural rules.
Some of these devices have worked by deemphasizing individual liti-
gant autonomy, in a manner inconsistent with a model that treats indi-
vidual control as a grundnorm.  The revised version of Rule 23,
159. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2145
(2000) (discussing the class action device as a subsidy to facilitate litigation).
160. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1282 (1976).
161. Id. at 1232.
162. Id. at 1283.
163. E.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,
846 (1999).
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finalized in 1966, draws its power from the joinder of class members to
litigation without their affirmative consent.164  The multidistrict litiga-
tion statute, enacted in 1968, usurps individual litigant control in favor
of collective processing.165  Other devices work by treating litigants
not as idiosyncratic individuals seeking particularized remedies, but as
undifferentiated vessels for law enforcement.  Legislated damages en-
hancements spiked starting in the late 1960s,166 and legislatures often
included statutory damages provisions along with new substantive
standards of conduct.167  These innovations focused lawsuits less on
individual compensation and instead emphasized the substantive law’s
regulatory force as a primary concern.
Other developments during this period likewise pushed the evolu-
tionary trajectory of civil litigation away from the “received tradi-
tion.”  These include the entrenchment and spread of impact
litigation,168 and the emergence of coordinated claim handling among
plaintiffs’ lawyers for mass torts.169  Legislation and rule making merit
particular emphasis, however, because through them, lawmakers have
expressly pursued a plan for the reconfiguration of American civil jus-
tice.  Statutory penalties, damages enhancements, and aggregation
mechanisms demonstrate a legislative preference in favor of—not
neutrality toward—rights vindication.170  The proliferation of these
devices coincided with an uptick in the legislation of private rights to
sue,171 as lawmakers sought to mobilize private litigants to enforce
164. On the early history of the modern Rule 23, see generally Marcus, supra note 4.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).  On the early history of multidistrict litigation, see Judith
Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 928–30 (1995).
166. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS
IN THE U.S. 66 (2010); see also Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 637, 644 (2013).
167. Burbank et al., supra note 166, at app. 719–22; see also Henry N. Butler & Joshua D.
Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163,
169–72 (2011).
168. Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New
Public Interest Law,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 455, 458 & n.21; see also Karen O’Connor & Lee Ep-
stein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 483, 484–93 (1984) (describing the emergence of public interest law and litigation starting
in the 1960s).
169. Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litiga-
tion, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 122–30 (1968); see also Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson,
Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961,
978 (1993) (describing the MER/29 litigation as the first mass tort litigation that involved signifi-
cant coordination among plaintiffs’ lawyers).
170. Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives To Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 785–95 (2011).
171. Burbank et al., supra note 166, at 647.
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new regulatory regimes.172  Civil litigation was explicitly recast and re-
lied on as a substitute for public administration,173 a phenomenon
Judge Weinstein understands well.174  The Reagan Administration
tried to scale back this “litigation state,” but it largely failed.175
When private litigation functions as an alternative to public admin-
istration, it has as its purpose more than just the remediation of indi-
vidual, discrete breaches of the social peace.  By design, this litigation
shoulders responsibility for the broad implementation of positively
enacted social and economic programs, just as agency action often
does.176  Title VII as initially applied, for example, bothered less with
individual compensation and instead sought social transformation
through the recreation of the American workplace.177  In this system
of civil justice, individual plaintiffs serve as representatives of a com-
munity of regulatory beneficiaries, even as they act on their own
behalf.
The AI model’s libertarian insistence on litigant autonomy makes it
poorly suited for an era, now fifty years old, in which the civil justice
system serves as a process explicitly designed for regulatory, extra-
individual ends.  The civil litigant qua atomistic individual is not a con-
tinuation of our recent procedural past, but a break with the history of
our procedural present.  It is no accident that the AI model disfavors
procedural mechanisms, such as the class action, that have contributed
powerfully to litigation’s regulatory objectives.  In other contexts, sev-
172. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1547–48 (2014).  For an example from the employment context, see James
J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563,
1571 n.33 (1996).
173. FARHANG, supra note 166, at 216–17.
174. E.g., Ramirez v. Dollar Phone Corp., No. 09-CV-2290 (JBW)(MDG), 2009 WL 3171738,
at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2009).
175. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 172, at 1545, 1551–55.
176. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 68, at 33 (“The 1960s and 1970s brought broad recognition
of the inability of traditional two-party litigation . . . to provide adequate enforcement of statutes
designed to cure the imperfections of the common law, provide equal economic opportunity, or
otherwise implement important social norms.  Inclined to rely on litigation in place of, or in
addition to, centralized administrative enforcement, lawmakers employed a variety of tech-
niques [of the sort discussed in this Part].”); see also Chayes, supra note 160, at 1288 (implying
that public law litigation involves “legislation designed explicitly to modify and regulate basic
social and economic arrangements”).  On agency adjudication and positive program implemen-
tation, see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABIL-
ITY CLAIMS 35 (1983).
177. E.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (describing Title VII’s
emphasis as on “eliminating discrimination in employment”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), re-
printed in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2401; Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain:
Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J.
887, 892–93.
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eral Justices have demonstrated a striking willingness to question well-
entrenched pillars buttressing parts of the American regulatory
state.178  Their embrace of the AI model should be understood in
these terms, not as part of an unbroken tradition, but as a rupture
pursued for deregulatory ends.
B. Doctrinal Determinants of Litigant Models
The doctrinal case for the AI model is no more self-evident than the
historical one.  Proponents of individualism in procedural design in-
voke the Due Process Clause and the Rules Enabling Act as laws re-
quiring the protection of individual litigant autonomy and individual
distinctiveness from community imperatives.  As presently developed,
however, neither law precludes a communitarian-inflected model of
the civil litigant.
1. Due Process
Each of the CM model’s core tenets raises due process concerns.
The status of a right to sue as constitutionally protected property trig-
gers two such problems.179  Is this right unlawfully compromised if a
judge invokes community concerns to abridge an individual’s control
over her participation in litigation? Taylor v. Sturgell begs something
like this question.  Can a remedy prioritize communal ends over the
individual redress that the right might otherwise afford?  Scholars ad-
vocating individualism in civil procedure have suggested that a due
process problem results if courts design remedies in this manner.180
These questions have no ready answer in due process doctrine rele-
vant to individual control over litigation and remedy.  Professor Alex-
andra Lahav has identified several strains of due process in the
Court’s procedural jurisprudence, including “traditional due process”
and “cost–benefit due process.”181  The first strain, exemplified by
Taylor v. Sturgell, requires procedural doctrine to respect individual
178. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(commenting on “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state”); Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.)
(“The growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every
aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus
from that of the people.”); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (questioning “whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our
Founders’ understanding of separation of powers” and suggesting a willingness to revisit the
nondelegation doctrine).
179. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (describing a “chose in action”
as a “constitutionally recognized property interest”).
180. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief, supra note 93, at 650–51.
181. Lahav, supra note 155, at 546.
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litigant autonomy and finds this obligation in a long tradition, albeit
one more imagined than real.182  The Court often invokes this tradi-
tion in discussions that place limits on aggregate procedure.183  In con-
trast, the cost–benefit strain, famously developed in Mathews v.
Eldridge,184 balances the individual litigant’s interests against extra-
individual ones to determine whether a particular procedure is consti-
tutionally acceptable.185  By this calculus, the successful administra-
tion of the substantive law and similar extra-individual goods can
justify processes that infringe on the autonomy of individual liti-
gants.186  To date, the Court has not done the sort of basic constitu-
tional lawmaking necessary to explain when one strain of due process
trumps the other, thereby requiring one model of the civil litigant over
its competitor.
The third core tenet of the CM model, the idea that population size
and composition can impact a litigant’s substantive legal identity,
raises a somewhat more complicated due process question.  The prob-
lem is best framed as involving an ostensible “right to defend.”  As the
argument goes, the substantive law affords a defendant a right to de-
fend against an individual plaintiff’s claim, defined as including partic-
ular elements and imposing a particular evidentiary burden.  If the
defendant cannot avail itself of precisely the same arguments or evi-
dence when it litigates against plaintiffs en masse, does the alteration
infringe on the defendant’s due process rights?187
The Second Circuit answered a version of this question in the af-
firmative when it scuttled the fluid recovery plan Judge Weinstein pro-
posed for the light cigarette litigation.188  When plaintiffs can use
aggregate methods to establish damages, the court held, “the right of
defendants to challenge the allegations of individual plaintiffs is lost,
resulting in a due process violation.”189  Measured against either of
Professor Lahav’s due process strains, however, this holding leaves
182. Id. at 548–49.
183. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
184. 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
185. Lahav, supra note 155, at 550.
186. See generally Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950)
(balancing the rights of people with an interest at stake in the litigation against the need of the
litigation to proceed and achieve socially valuable outcomes); Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Indi-
vidualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 975–77 (1993) (commenting on Mullane’s meaning).
187. Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants’ New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 319, 320
[hereinafter Moller, New Lochnerism]; see also Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Uncon-
stitutional Class Actions and Options for Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 857 (2005).
188. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’g Schwab v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
189. Id. at 232.
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something to be desired.  In his rigorous study of the “right to de-
fend,” Professor Mark Moller concludes that neither traditional nor
cost–benefit due process places this ostensible right on constitutional
footing.190  Utilitarian and traditional approaches to due process, he
concludes, “converge on essentials . . . .  Then and now, due process
leaves a great deal of room for courts to regulate parties’ opportuni-
ties to present relevant evidence in civil proceedings in the service of
equity and convenience.”191
Judge Weinstein undertook the cost–benefit calculation when he
certified a “limited fund” punitive damages class in an episode of to-
bacco litigation, finding the balance of interests to favor the modifica-
tion of defenses available to the tobacco companies.192  The Ninth
Circuit did the same when it approved the “trial by formula” that the
plaintiffs proposed in Wal-Mart.193  Perhaps the judges applied
cost–benefit due process doctrine incorrectly in these specific in-
stances.  But my concern is whether alterations to legal identities that
the CM model tolerates necessarily trigger a due process violation.
Neither the Second Circuit, reversing Judge Weinstein,194 nor the Su-
preme Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit,195 explained why a
cost–benefit approach to due process cannot apply in this circum-
stance, or why its balance of interests necessarily excludes the sorts of
innovations Judge Weinstein and the Ninth Circuit fashioned.196
2. The Rules Enabling Act
At first blush, the Enabling Act’s “substantive rights” limitation197
offers better ammunition against the idea that a litigant’s legal identity
can change as the affected community increases in size.  In Wal-Mart,
for instance, the plaintiffs proposed their “trial by formula” to facili-
190. Moller, New Lochnerism, supra note 187, at 321–23; see also id. at 324 n.30 (acknowledg-
ing that earlier arguments for a right to defend in a previous article are “without merit”).
191. Id. at 324.
192. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 153–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d
Cir. 2005).
193. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 627–28 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131
S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
194. In re Simon II, 407 F.3d 125.
195. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
196. Professor Martin Redish, who has done more to develop the theoretical support for
something like an autonomous individual model of a claimant than anyone else, concedes that
existing doctrine under Mathews does not preclude these sorts of procedural innovations. MAR-
TIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 144–45 (2009); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 565, 566 (2013).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
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tate class certification.198  The Court disallowed this alteration to what
the defendant would have otherwise faced in individual actions
“[b]ecause the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to
‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.’”199  As the majority
opinion reasoned, “[A] class cannot be certified on the premise that
Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to indi-
vidual claims.”200
The Court’s terse treatment of the Enabling Act in Wal-Mart be-
trays the statute’s complexity,201 and in particular, it ignores an impor-
tant observation that Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff has best
articulated: the substantive law itself may provide for an alteration in
the rights, duties, and defenses at issue in an aggregate proceeding.202
When Judge Weinstein permits the use of aggregate proof in a class
action, or denies the defendants an opportunity to mount individual-
ized defenses to particular class members’ claims, the trial plan does
not violate the Enabling Act if a plausible interpretation of the under-
lying substantive law authorizes the adjustment.
An Enabling Act violation does not necessarily follow even if a
judge cannot find authorization for the alteration in the substantive
law using accepted methods of statutory interpretation.  The judge
may have sufficient federal common lawmaking power to take inter-
stitial steps to adjust a liability standard or evidentiary requirement in
a manner that renders it more suitable for aggregate processing.203
Judge Weinstein did not tap Rule 23 as the font for his determination
that the plaintiffs could use aggregate evidence to establish reliance in
198. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
199. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2008)).
200. Id.
201. On the complexity of the Enabling Act, see, for example, Allan Ides, The Standard for
Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between
Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2011).  Part of the difficulty
stems from the Court’s recent treatments of the Enabling Act.  In Shady Grove, a plurality of
Justices opined that a rule’s validity under the “substantive rights” limitation should be tested by
reference to the words of the rule alone and not its application in discrete instances.  Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (plurality opin-
ion).  The Wal-Mart dicta suggest that an otherwise-valid rule can be applied in violation of
Enabling Act strictures. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.  On facial and as applied challenges and
the Enabling Act, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Sonia, What’s a Nice Person Like You Doing in
Company Like That?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 107, 109 (2010).
202. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1027, 1041 (2013); see also United States v. City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 44 n.11 (E.D.N.Y.
2011); George Rutherglen, The Way Forward After Wal-Mart, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 871, 897
(2012).
203. For an example of the exercise of this power, see In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust
Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2012 WL 555090, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); see also Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Burbank & Wolff, supra note 68, at 67.
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the light cigarette litigation.204  Rather, he made this evidentiary de-
termination in a prior opinion—one having nothing explicitly to do
with class certification—in which he denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss on the merits.205  Surely, the fact that the case proceeded as a
class action “catalyzed” the substantive innovation, for Judge Wein-
stein would have had no reason to consider aggregate proof in an indi-
vidual lawsuit.206  But the catalyst for an innovation and the law that
ultimately authorizes it can differ.
The evolution of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine (FOTM), which
advocates have challenged on Enabling Act grounds in the Court,207
demonstrates this distinction.  The doctrine provides for a presump-
tion of reliance on misstatements when markets for securities are effi-
cient, on grounds that the share price, which investors rely on when
they make purchases, internalizes all information.  Securities fraud
plaintiffs would face great difficulty getting a class certified without
the doctrine, because individual issues would predominate over com-
mon ones if each class member had to make a personal showing of
reliance.
But Rule 23 is not the legal source for FOTM.  An exercise in fed-
eral common lawmaking may have initially produced FOTM,208 but
today a judge can legitimately find authority for it by interpreting the
statutory regime for securities governance.  The doctrine’s origins date
most importantly to a 1975 decision from the Ninth Circuit.209  When
the defendants in the case challenged the adoption of FOTM on Ena-
bling Act grounds, the Ninth Circuit insisted that it found authority to
craft the presumption in its substantive lawmaking powers, not in
Rule 23.210  The Supreme Court then blessed FOTM in 1988, invoking
“considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as
204. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d sub
nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).
205. Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
206. Wolff, supra note 202, at 1047.
207. For an argument that the FOTM presumption violates the Rules Enabling Act, see Brief
for Vivendi S.A. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 18, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317).
208. For the suggestion that FOTM doctrine originated in federal common law, see Edward
A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of Codifying the
Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 95 (arguing that
“the content of the private cause of action for securities fraud is largely the product of ‘federal
common law’”); see also id. at 104–05 (discussing FOTM within the context of this discussion).
209. E.g., Marcus, supra note 4, at 632–33 (discussing Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
210. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908; see also Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (defending the presumption similarly).
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judicial economy” as support—again, not Rule 23.211  When Congress
examined securities fraud class actions in the early 1990s, it rejected
proposed legislation that would have ended the presumption.212  In a
recent decision involving FOTM, the Court recited this legislative his-
tory and clarified that FOTM now has roots in the statutory regime.213
In any particular instance, a substantive transformation consistent
with procedural needs might indeed violate the Enabling Act, if the
judge cannot use her own lawmaking powers to craft the alteration, or
if the best interpretation of the statutory regime does not permit it.214
In other situations, the substantive law might not only allow but also
counsel for these alterations.215  When the substantive law does so, as
courts in public law litigation routinely (if implicitly) determine,216 the
transformation is not an “alchemy-like” violation of the Enabling
Act,217 but a straightforward implementation of lawmaker will.  My
point is simply that, as a general matter, the Enabling Act does not
necessarily preclude the sorts of alterations that the CM model
contemplates.
C. The Uncertain Normative Case for the AI Model
As with my historical and doctrinal arguments, I offer my theoreti-
cal challenge to the AI model simply to dispute that it is self-evidently
better than the CM model as a conception of the civil litigant.  A com-
plete normative defense of the CM model would require much more
than I provide here.  Professor Martin Redish has crafted a richly the-
orized, sophisticated case for individualism in procedural design.218  I
borrow from and tweak his claims to identify the sort of arguments
211. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
212. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 151, 153 n.8.
213. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200–01 (2013).
214. Wolff, supra note 202, at 1028–29.
215. E.g., Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1117 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“The law is willing to adjust the standard of proof . . . using notions of common sense and
fairness to effectuate the overall purpose of the statutory scheme.”), rev’d sub nom. McLaughlin
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).
216. E.g., M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 31–33 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (discussing substantive due
process doctrine and determining that it vests children in foster care with an undifferentiated
claim for a risk of harm); Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 249
F.R.D. 334, 345 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (making a similar finding); Disability Rights Council of Greater
Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 239 F.R.D. 9, 26 (D.D.C. 2006) (interpreting the
Americans with Disabilities Act to vest the plaintiffs with a “universal claim” that does not
require any individual plaintiff to demonstrate individualized harm).
217. Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 753, 797 (2007).
218. See generally REDISH, supra note 196; Redish & Katt, supra note 24, at 1888–94.
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than an advocate for the AI model might make.  To my mind, they fall
short of what is necessary to relegate Judge Weinstein’s approach to
the dustbin of procedural jurisprudence.
Professor Redish makes two claims about the practice of legitimate
government in a democracy to support his preference for individual-
ism in procedural design.  First, at the “micro level,” “the individual
must be able to decide how he will seek to influence the governing
process for the purpose of either protecting or fostering his own per-
sonal interests or advancing ideological goals he deems important.”219
If litigation as a governing process is to proceed legitimately, then “in-
dividuals must be able to make autonomous choices about how best to
pursue their own interests in court.”220  The CM model subjects the
freedom of an individual to control her participation in litigation to
the imperatives of communal concerns.  By Professor Redish’s metric
of democratic theory, this conception compares poorly to the AI
model, which insists that individual litigants enjoy maximum auton-
omy, unfettered by group needs.
This argument smacks into an uncontroversial pragmatic reality.  In
many well-accepted ways, procedural doctrine significantly constrains
litigant autonomy in the service of extra-individual ends, such as effi-
ciency and judicial legitimacy.221  One constraint is as basic as it gets.
A defendant will have little luck getting a case against her dismissed
simply because the plaintiff made choices as to the time and place of
litigation.  At some level, utilitarian considerations always trump lib-
ertarian values, a priority that manifests itself in ways that no proce-
dural theorist of whom I am aware has challenged.  The compulsory
counterclaim rule, for instance, causes no consternation, even though
it forces a defendant, sued against its will, to allege all claims that arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s claim.222
An argument from democratic theory that stresses individual control
as the determinant of legitimacy must explain why such anodyne con-
straints on individual autonomy are acceptable, while others consis-
tent with the CM model are not.
Institutional constraints on judicial power in a democracy inspire a
second, “macro level” argument for individualism as a fundamental
principle of procedural design.  The substantive law, usually crafted by
219. REDISH, supra note 196, at 4.
220. Redish & Berlow, supra note 217, at 768.
221. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Ag-
gregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 619–22 (2011); see also
Tidmarsh, supra note 196, at 576–77.
222. Tidmarsh, supra note 196, at 577 n.61.
568 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:537
an institution with electoral accountability, fixes individuals’ legal
identities in advance of litigation.223  The CM model allows a judge to
define a litigant’s rights or defenses differently as the size of the af-
fected population changes.  Such judicial alterations amount to usur-
pations inconsistent with democratic theory.  This lawmaking happens
“not . . . through the use of the democratic process of legislative
amendment, where the electorate may measure its chosen representa-
tives by how they voted on the proposed revisions of existing law,” but
through procedural machinations of democratically unaccountable
judges.224  The AI model better respects the judiciary’s proper institu-
tional role within a democratic government by protecting litigant iden-
tity as provided for in the substantive law from judicial tampering.
I questioned a version of this argument in my discussion of the Ena-
bling Act in Part III.B.2.  The substantive law may itself vest litigants
with different legal identities depending on their relationships with
each other.225  If legislatures authorize alterations to liability regimes
for aggregate proceedings, or if the Constitution gives judges enough
lawmaking latitude to make these alterations themselves, then the CM
model authorizes nothing inconsistent with our democratic order.
Moreover, Professor Redish’s “macro level” claim about demo-
cratic theory, if right, calls into question far more than just the sort of
communitarian tendencies Judge Weinstein has demonstrated in ag-
gregate litigation.  In a “democratic society,” Professor Redish insists,
“[t]hose who make basic normative choices of social and moral policy
. . . must at some level be representative of and accountable to those
whom they govern.”226  This claim may be so, but it says little about
how much policy an unelected official can legitimately make within
broad constraints set by an institution accountable to an electorate.
The nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to subject an agency’s
policymaking prerogative to only the most expansive of limits.227
Within these delegated policymaking spaces, agencies make an enor-
mous amount of economic and social policy, certainly more than what
judges like Judge Weinstein have forged with their tweaks to the sub-
223. REDISH, supra note 196, at 5.
224. Id. at 21–22.
225. Professor Redish claims that most of the substantive law enforced through class actions
vests claims exclusively in individuals. REDISH, supra note 196, at 36.  This assertion bears some
empirical scrutiny.  For instance, a lot of public law class actions involve claims vested in groups,
not individuals. See supra notes 176 and 177 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of this
issue, see Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
593, 616–30 (2012).
226. REDISH, supra note 196, at 13.
227. E.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1240–41 (1994).
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stantive law.  A federal judge who tinkers with an element of a claim
or the evidence required to establish it to vindicate the policy of the
substantive law must pose less of a threat to democratic government
than, say, an independent agency with fulsome rulemaking power.
Professor Redish unsurprisingly dislikes the nondelegation doctrine in
its present guise,228 but it and the message it expresses about lawmak-
ing outside legislatures are nonetheless well entrenched.
A final critique of arguments for the sort of individualism that un-
dergirds the AI model questions whether Professor Redish’s approach
to democratic theory provides the only acceptable metric to evaluate
the legitimacy of American legal processes.  Judge Weinstein’s empha-
sis on civic engagement, informed deliberation, and functional efficacy
tap into civic republicanism, another richly theorized theory of gov-
ernmental legitimacy.  To put it crudely, a civic republican emphasizes
equal, inclusive, and broad participation by an engaged population,
deliberating toward a common goal, as a source of legitimacy for the
exercise of power.229  The goal is government action aimed at the
common good, not action to serve individuals’ particular interests.230
The CM model fits a civic republican mold, because it pegs rights and
duties not to individual entitlements but to litigants’ communal con-
nections, and because it contemplates a sacrifice of litigant autonomy
in favor of the common good.  Professor Redish has challenged the
normative appeal of civic republicanism as a theory suitable for civil
litigation.231  But his view is not the consensus among scholars of civil
procedure.232
IV. CONCLUSION
To my mind, the autonomous individual model of the civil litigant is
not self-evidently superior to the community member model.  Like-
wise, the unrestrained, aggressive individualism that the Roberts
Court has embraced is not obviously better for procedural design than
Judge Weinstein’s communitarianism.  I nonetheless recognize that I
have not made the case for the CM model, a task that must remain for
228. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 135–61 (1995).
229. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541–42
(1988).
230. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511, 1531 (1992).
231. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional
Role of Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953–1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 364–68 (2001).
232. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1028 (2010)
(challenging more generally individual participation as necessarily central to adjudicative
legitimacy).
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another venture.  I wonder, though, if the fact of this festschrift alone
says something about the appeal of Judge Weinstein’s procedural vi-
sion.  He is worthy of celebration not only because of his great intel-
lectual firepower.  Judge Weinstein is also uncommonly humane, a
trait that has manifestly motivated his ceaseless efforts to use proce-
dure to achieve wide and equal justice.  Does the Court’s arid individ-
ualism have the same capacity for empathetic justice?  I doubt that it
does.
